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ECONOMICS - A SET OF BELIEFS 
A large nu~ber of Economists regard economics to be a science. To 
quote the opening statement from a recent article in the American 
Economic Feview: "Among its practitioners there is a widespread feeling 
that modern economics has established itself as a science enjoying a 
high degree of consensus"( Bruno s. Frey, Werner w. Pornmerehne, 
Friedrich, Schneider, and Guy Gilbert, p.986). 
''Science" according to Funk and Wagnalls College Standard Dictionary is 
the "knowledge as of facts, laws, and proximate causes, gained and 
verified by exact observations and correct thinking." 
Reflecting en economic theory one recalls that indeed economists 
speak of "laws" of economics, e.g.; the "law" of demand, and causal 
relationships, e.g.; changes in the money supply cause proportionate 
changes in prices. In addition these propositions are accompanied by 
empirical verification. Apparently this qualifies economics to be a 
science, though admittedly "science" should technically be modified 
by the word "social". However, this modification is regarded as 
somewhat of a stigma, or an implication that economic propositions are 
less than "pure truth". Certainly increasing mathematical rigor has 
been pursued by many economists in an attempt to remove the stigma of 
economics as 2 "social" science and to elevate it to the level of pure 
science. Obviously the notion that the rigor of the mathematical model 
and the scientific content of the results are positive correlated has 
been accepted. In fact, undergraduate neoclassical microeconomics as 
taught in the classrooms of most major universities in the United States 
differs little from a mathematics class. The propositions are generally 
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presented as pure science, mathematically derivable from a small number 
of inocuous assumptions. In light of this general attitude toward 
economics, as expressed in the opening statement of the previously 
quoted AER article, the remainder of the article provokes thought, as it 
provides empirical evidence which denies any credibility to the opening 
statement. 
I. More Dissension than Consensus 
The AER Article presents empirical measurement of the degree of 
harmony and discord among economists. It reports the results of the 
questioning of 936 economists about their viewpoints regarding 27 
economic propositions. The range of these propositions extends to both 
micro and macro, positive and normative issues. And, in spite of the 
assertion that economics is a "science enjoying a high degree of 
consensus'', the empirical evidence presented in the paper reveals no 
complete co1,sensus or. any one issue. Even on those issues which are 
classified as positive rdcroeconornic, the most innocuous category of 
economic proposition, there is dissension. Why the divergence of 
opinion in U:e realm of what is referred to as "science"? Certainly 
there are some areas of science in which there is accord. For example, 
in the real!;\ c,f chemistry one could find agreement among chemists 
regarding the outcome of the reaction between sodium hydroxide and 
. f. . 1 d. · l hydrochloric acid under speci ied experu: 1.enta con itions. 
The r,ost obvious explanation for the dissension among economists is 
that economics is not, and can not be, a pure science, in spite of the 
fact that economists have apparently attempted to persuade themselves 
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and the public that mathematical rigor can transform economics, a social 
science, which is really more like religion than chemistry, into pure 
science. 
II. An J'..ppeal to Faith? 
The tenets of any religious system are ultimately accepted on the 
basis of faith, i.e., if one believes, the propositions are true. These 
propositions are categorized as "beliefs". Interestingly, the AER 
article explicitly categorizes the propositions to which economists 
adhere as beliefs. "What economists think, and whether there is 
consensus among economists, would not be a matter of concern if beliefs 
do not have aver}' strong effect on economic policy decisions and on the 
state of the economy" (Frey et al,p.986). The article goes on, 
apparently assuming that the reader is comfortable with the fact that 
economic, not Just theolo9ical, propositions can he categorized as 
beliefs, not noting the tension between belief and pure science, to tell 
the reader that a test of the corr~onality of beliefs has been conducted. 
"We seek to determine the degree to which certain beliefs are widely 
shared among economists in a given country and across countries". (Frey 
et al,p.986). Statistical tests to determine the commonality of beliefs 
among econoDists usin9 cata from the returned questionaires are 
reported. Though the authors assert that there are some propositions on 
which there is some degree of general consensus, when the sample is 
stratified by nationalities into "pro-government" versus "pro-market" 
categories, the conclusion of the study is that economists are not all 
of one faith: "In general, it could not be confirmed that positive and 
micro-propositions find a higher degree of consensus than normative and 
r:1acro-propositions". (Frey et al,p.994). 
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In the realm of theology a lack of consensus is not alarming. The 
object of perception is eternal and invisible. And 
theologians do not assert that theology is science. However in the 
realm of economics the object of knowledge is both temporal and 
visible 2 , and economists do claim to be scientists. The world at large 
does not discount religion because all are not Catholic, but the 
condemnation of economists is vitriolic. Recently, on the editorial 
page of the Wall Street Journal, Tom Landess wrote: 
~-Jhen George Bush used the phrase "voodoo economics" 
we objected not because we thought it was inaccurate 
but because we thought it was redundant. And while 
we're perfectly willing to admit that First Amend-
ment rights extend to economists, we'd probably sup-
port a law that made it mandatory that when discussing 
public policy they be required to wear long-sleeved 
gowns and pointed hats covered with stars and moons" 
(Tom Landess) 
And this condemnation is not merely the result of the spate of recent 
forecasting errors as Harry Truman's request for a one-handed economist, 
so he would not have to deal with "on the one hand this and on the other 
hand that" demonstrates. Obviously, the layman expects from economists, 
as so called scientists, what he does not expect from theologians, i.e., 
pure scientific truth. Yet universally accepted economic truth has not 
emerged. 
III. The Quest for the Truth of Pure Science 
Visionaries of the past have provided argument for the inevitable 
emergence of the truth in all categories among rational men. William 
Godwin, writing in 1793, certainly envisioned such an outcome based on 
the cultivation of knowledge leading to the soundness of understanding. 
(William Godwin,p.77-78) Marx also asserted that belief, in his 
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verbiage "ideology", would be escaped and truth would be perceived and 
propigated by the working class. To quote W. Stark: " ••. in Marx's 
thought ... there is a class whose special interests do not lead to a 
distorted but to a truthful picture of reality, in whose case, in other 
words, ideological vision coincides with realistic vision, wish-
determination with fact-determination". (Stark,p.100). Yet, after more 
than one hundred years the "realistic vision" among even the working 
class is disparate. Universal truth has either not manifest itself, or 
man has not perceived its manifestation. 
But heterodox visionaries, such as Godwin and Marx, were not alone 
in their belief in the extinction of belief. In answer to Marx's claim 
that classical economics was the product of an ingrained ideology, 
merely a set of beliefs predicated on socialization and propigated as an 
apology for capitalism, the neoclassical economists countered with what 
was termed by Menger as "value-free" science. V.enger claimed the 
removal of values and beliefs from theoretical economic science. 
Therefore, according to Menger, theoretical economic propositions could 
be universally accepted as pure scientific truth. (E.K. Hunt,p.250) 
Walras echoed this sentiment when he said in reference to economics: 
"Indeed the distinguishing characteristic of a science is complete 
indifference to consequences, good or bad, with which it carries on the 
pursuit of pure truth". (Leon Walras,p.52). Indeed, many neoclassical 
economists view themselves as scientists in possession of some portion 
of pure scientific truth. For example, Armen A. Alchian and William R. 
Allen claim the economic theory presented in their text, University 
Economics, is: " .•. a valid care of economic theory applicable to all 
economic syste~s and countries." (Armen A. Alchian, and William R. 
Allen, ,p.5). 
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Nevertheless, in spite of the claims to revelation of "truth" and 
universally valid theories from both Marxists and neoclassicals, there 
is no consensus on fundamental economic principles or appropriate 
economic policy even within categorical divisions. 
IV. Inevitable Failure 
The dissension is inevitable. Economics is social science, not 
pure science. As such, belief, not truth, is its domain, beliefs which 
are not timeless and universal, but temporal and particular, integrally 
related to historical exigencies; a relationship which cannot be 
overcome or eliminated through mathematization. Economic theory and 
policy emerge out of a particular social-historical framework not an 
experimental vacuum. Frey, et al broach this issue by hypothesizing: 
"One cause for this disagreement may be that economists living in 
various countries have experienced different historical developments and 
the traditions are based on different cultural backgrounds" 
(Frey et al,p.990). What is amazing is the use of the word "may". Even 
religous dogma, dogma dealing with the immutable and eternal can not be 
divorced from historical exigencies, ( e.g., the Pope's recent dictum.) 
A fortiori economic dogma, concerning the mutable and temporal, 
communicated by man, not merely through man but by God, must be a 
function of changing temporal social conditions, and therefore not 
immutable truth but mutable belief. Karl Mannheim explained this 
problem of historical relatively through his distinction between the 
extra-mental reality, the materials of knowledge which remain constant 
and the intra-mental reality, the chosen objects of knowledge which are 
a function of one's historical environment, and therefore, ever 
changing. The recognition by both the economist and the layman that 
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economic principles are in fact beliefs, not truths, ultimately 
predicated on transient temporal perception, not eternal and absolute 
reason might serve to mitigate the criticism. The economist's assertion 
that his beliefs are in fact pure science only invites condemnation and 
reflects the centuries old confusion highlighted by Plato in The Republic 
between the particular and the universal, the many and the one, the 
shadows in the cave and the ultimate light. The economist is caught in 
the cave where: "To them, I said the truth would be eternally nothing 
but the shadows of the images". (Plato, p.254). Because the shadows are 
fuzzy the perceptions differ. But, who among social scientists is not 
caught in this same cave. Certainly Plato envisioned the emergence from 
the cave of a few who would be philosopher kings. But if such emergence 
has occured the world at large has not perceived. Economists are 
certainly not the only remaining fettered beings observing the shadows. 
Nor are they the only observers to assume the shadows are reality and to 
try to convince the world they have glimpsed the ultimate light. Yet 
the nature of economic theory and policy: 1) that it can be empirically 
refuted, and 2) that it is integrally tied to the material well being of 
the people, combined with a large number of economists propigating the 
facade of pure science, inevitably produces more alarm among the general 
populus over the discord among econonists than the discord among theolo-
gians. As a result the "faith" which the general public places in 
economists pales in comparison to the economist's faith in his beliefs. 
A faith which is so strong among some, as to elicit the claim that 
economics is pure science; a claim which is untenable in light of the 
recent AER article, unless a significant number of those surveyed were 
not, in reality, economists. 
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V. Concluding Remarks 
Economics is a social science. Eternal immutable truths are not 
the stuff of which economics is comprised. Historical exigencies and 
the complexity and unpredictability - Keynes' pervasive "animal 
spirits"-of human behaviour must be recognized. In the final analysis 
any system of economic theories is a set of beliefs - as the AER article 
states without even a comment. The fact that a variety of economists 
adhere to various sets of beliefs should be less alarming than the 
existence of multiple theological systems which analyze the eternal and 
immutable. But, economists themselves must first admit the limitations 
of their "scientific'' tenets in spite of their mathematical expertise. 
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Notes 
1. NaOH + HCL = 
2. Of course it is easier to adhere to theories regarding the 
eternal and invisible, as contrary evidence is not 
forthcoming. 
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